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TOTAL RISK, SYSTEMATIC RISK, AND OFF-BALANCE SHEET
RISK FOR LARGE COMMERCIAL BANKS
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial banks provide a variety of financial services to their
customers. A traditional view of banking is that most of these ser-
vices impact on banks' balance sheets—banks add to asset holdings
funded by deposit or other liability sources of funds. Several devel-
oping forces, including technological innovation and increased compe-
tition, have led to an unbundling of the provision of financial ser-
vices by banks. Thus unbundling has resulted in an increasing portion
of bank activity which does not have an impact on the balance sheet.
Banks are able to provide for the credit and other financial needs of
their customers in ways that create contingent liabilities or commit-
ments that do not appear on the bank's balance sheet.
The growth of standby letters of credit (SLC), an off-balance
sheet contingent liability, illustrates the increasing presence of off-
balance sheet items for commercial banks. In 1973 only 7.7 percent of
all banks reported the existence of SLCs , and for these banks the
ratio of SLCs to equity was 8.4 percent. At year end 1986 55.6 percent
of all banks reported SLCs representing 11.7 percent of equity. For
the largest banks SLCs have risen from 38 percent of equity at year
end 1973 to 155.9 percent of equity by year end 1986.
As the quantity of off-balance sheet items has increased, policy
questions have developed. How much risk exposure is generated by the
existence, sometimes in relatively large quantities, of these off-
balance sheet items? If risk-reducing regulation has its focus on a
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bank's balance sheet, will the regulation be capable of controlling
the bank's total risk exposure.
One question we are interested in investigating in this paper is
the extent to which, if at all, market participants take account of
the off-balance sheet activity of large commercial banks. A second
question is whether the market considers this off-balance sheet activ-
ity as an addition to the riskiness of the banks stock, or perhaps
through a diversification effect, a decrease in bank riskiness.
In this paper we examine the market's reaction to the existence of
off-balance sheet items. We use accounting-based risk forecasting
models to investigate the impact of off-balance sheet items on both
total risk and systematic risk for large commercial banks. In Section
II the risks associated with the off-balance sheet items of banks are
examined; in Section III the models are presented and the data is
described; Section IV presents the empirical results; and Section V
contains conclusions and policy recommendations.
II. BANK OFF-BALANCE SHEET ITEMS AND RISK
Bank off-balance sheet items constitute a diverse group of instru-
ments and commitments with a variety of functions. These items reflect
innovative ways banks meet the needs of their customers, usually for
future time periods. However, from a regulatory point of view they
result in ". . . an expanding portion of bank activities [that] cannot
be monitored closely. Moreover, these instruments could pose a risk
to the stability of individual banks" (Wolkowitz [1982], p. 3).
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Table 1 lists the types of off-balance sheet items that are
reported in Schedule RC-L of bank, call reports and shows each item as
a percentage of total assets and of equity for a sample of 81 large
banks at year-end 1986. As a percentage of equity (1) unused loan
commitments, (2) commitments to purchase foreign currencies, (3) the
notional value of interest rate swaps, and (4) standby letters of
credit (to US and foreign addressees) each average over 100 percent
for the sample.
For these four off-balance sheet items the potential risk exposure
is quite different. Unused loan commitments could, at any time, be
drawn down and impact the balance sheet. If these new loans are
funded by a marginal increase in liabilities, financial leverage will
increase. However, there is no reason to believe that the credit risk
of these new loans will alter the overall credit risk exposure of the
bank. Commitments to purchase foreign currencies include spot, for-
ward, and futures contracts. Some of these will, in time, result in a
cash outflow, but a portion of these commitments will be offset by
other transactions and will have no balance sheet effects. The risk
that the counterparty in any particular commitment will default exists,
but could be small.
Counterparty default in an interest rate swap may lead to a loss
for the bank, but the amount of loss is much smaller than the notional
amount of the swap. Finally, standby letters of credit entail a
degree of credit risk. If the contingency occurs which activates the
letter of credit, the bank is likely to acquire a claim that has a
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substantial risk of default. The funding of Che claim will also in-
crease financial leverage.
Another class of off-balance sheet items involves instruments
which have been participated to others. These participations illus-
trate the unbundling of the financing from the origination and ser-
vicing activities. If these participations are done without recourse
they represent little or no risk, to the originating bank..
Characterizing the impact that off-balance sheet items have on a
bank's risk is not straightforward. Regulators have recently proposed
a risk-based capital regulation scheme in which the existence of cer-
tain off-balance sheet items will increase the minimum amount of capi-
tal that will be required to be held. The current regulatory minimum
capital ratios do not take into account the existence of off-balance
sheet positions and are calculated using balance sheet data. It has
been argued that the current capital regulation has encouraged banks
to engage in activities that create off-balance sheet items and fee
revenue without increasing the requirement for capital (see Giddy
[1985]). The presumption underlying the proposed requirement is that
the existence of off-balance sheet items increases risk exposure and
the bank's capital position must be increased accordingly to absorb
this increase in risk.
Evidence of the impact of off-balance sheet items on bank risk is
sketchy. Several studies have used data on standby letters of credit
as a proxy for all off-balance sheet items. Wall and Peterson [1986]
include a measure of standby letters of credit in testing the deter-
minants of capital ratios. Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies [1985] test the
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influence of standby letters of credit on the rates paid on a bank's
large, negotiable certificates of deposit. In both studies the off-
balance sheet variable was not a significant explanator.
Brewer, Koppenhaver, and Wilson [1986] test the significance of
three off-balance sheet items in a model relating bank excess returns
to market and industry excess returns, where bank excess returns are
interpreted as a risk premium. Of the three items included in the
model only SLCs were significantly related to excess returns. The
coefficients on the loan commitment and commercial letter of credit
variables were not significant. The SLC coefficient was negative
leading to the interpretation that this off-balance sheet item is a
risk-reducing, not risk-increasing, activity of banks.
III. MODEL AND DATA
The main purpose of this paper is to use accounting-based risk
forecasting models to investigate the impact of a variety of off-
balance sheet items on both total risk and systematic risk for large
commercial banks. The accounting-based risk forecasting models are
defined as:
Sjt = a + a lXljt + a 2X2jt + ••• + a 5 X5jt ^
Bjt
= b + b
l
Xljt + b 2X2jt + "• + b 5 X5jt (2)
where S = total risk for the jth bank in period t;
B. = systematic risk for the jth bank in period t;
X. = financial leverage for the jth bank in period t;
X«. = growth rate for the jth bank in period t;
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X^,
.
= operating leverage for the jth bank in period t;
X, = capital-labor ratio for the jth bank in period t; and
X^ = standard deviation of accounting earnings for the jth
J bank in period t.
Total risk, S is the standard deviation of monthly stock price
return including dividends for the five year period 1981-1985. System-
atic risk, B.
,
is estimated in (3)
R
jt
= b
o
+ BjAt + ejt (3)
where R is the monthly excess return including dividends for bank j
in period t and R^ is the monthly excess return for the CRSP value-
weighted market index. Five years of monthly data is used to estimate
V
To minimize the problem of end-of-year window dressing of account-
ing data, variables X through X^. are constructed using 20 quar-
terly observations for the 1981-1985 period. Financial leverage, X
is the ratio of total equity to total assets; X is the average
annual growth rate in net income calculated each quarter compared to
the same quarter in the previous year. Operating leverage, X^. , is
calculated as the percentage change in earnings before interest and
taxes divided by the percentage change in total operating revenue.
X, is the ratio of salary expense to bank fixed assets. Finally,
Xr. is the standard deviation of quarterly net income for the five
year period.
Jahankhani and Lynge [1980] estimated models that have some simi-
larities with (1) and (2). Using data from the early 1970s, measures
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of a bank's dividend payout ratio, deposit variability, and the loan
to deposit ratio were significant explanators of bank systematic risk.
Significant explanators of bank total risk were dividend payout ratio,
financial leverage, deposit variability, and a measure of loan losses.
The impact of financial leverage was negative on both systematic and
total risk.
The variables included in models (1) and (2) relate various
accounting measures that proxy risk to the market measures of risk.
Theoretically, both total risk and systematic risk should be negatively
related to financial leverage and positively related to the standard
deviation of accounting earnings. Systematic risk can be either posi-
tively or negatively related to the growth rate in earnings and to
operating leverage. The labor to capital ratio, as the measure used
here is constituted, should be positively related to systematic risk.
Extensive data on bank off-balance sheet activity is only avail-
able for the years 1984 and forward. Therefore, in the empirical work
all off-balance sheet variables are averages of year-end 1984 and 1985
values. Although other variables cover a five year period, the pre-
sumption utilized here is that the 1984-1985 off-balance sheet activ-
ity of commercial banks is representative of their activity for the
full five years.
To test the impacts of the presence of the off-balance sheet items,
the leverage variable, X,.
, is calculated both with total assets and
with total assets augmented by a group of off-balance sheet items that
could, if certain future contingencies occur, result in an increase in
bank assets, thereby increasing financial leverage. This group is
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cons true ted as the sura of items 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, and LI minus item 8
from Table 1. In addition, several individual off-balance sheet items
and other groups of items, each as a percent of total assets, are
entered separately as independent variables in addition to those vari-
ables specified in (1) and (2).
As the off-balance sheet exposure of commercial banks has increased
in recent year, it is expected that market participants include this
information in pricing the banks' common stocks. If this is the case,
and if the activity represented by off-balance sheet items adds to
bank risk, then the existence of these items should be reflected in
market measures of risk. If this is the case it may be detected by an
improved explanatory power of the models incorporating one or more
measures of off-balance sheet items compared to the models that do not
include the off-balance sheet items. Whether the presence of off-
balance sheet exposure increases or decreases a bank's risk exposure
can be inferred from the signs of the estimated coefficients of the
off-balance sheet variables.
If off-balance sheet risk is a diversif iable risk then it will be
significantly related to total risk (in equation [1]) instead of sys-
tematic risk (in equation [2]). Since nonsystematic risk is diver-
sifiable, well-diversified investors are not concerned with this risk..
However, nonsystematic risk is still a concern of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) since nonsystematic financial risk will
affect the probability of default by a bank (Ronn and Verraa [1986]).
If systematic risk is affected by the presence of off-balance
sheet items, then a degree of market regulation is at work bringing
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pressure on the returns of banks with large off-balance sheet risk
exposure to compensate investors for this increased risk, or to reduce
other sources of risk. To the extent that this market force alters
bank behavior, the need for regulatory attention to off-balance sheet
risk exposure is diminished.
Stock price data and related financial statement data for a sample
of 81 large commercial banks or bank holding companies is used for
empirical analysis. Holding company data is taken from the Bank
Compustat tape. Data on off-balance sheet items will be taken from
schedule RC-L of bank call reports for the lead bank of the holding
company. The sample is restricted to those bank holding companies
whose lead bank accounts for the majority of the consolidated holding
company assets. Average sample values for the 81 banks and bank
holding companies are shown in Table 2.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated coefficients and t-ratios for
models (1) and (2) respectively. Line 1 of Tables 3 and 4 represent
the base case excluding any off-balance sheet variables. When total
risk, S,
,
is the dependent variable (Table 3), the estimated coef-
ficients of the financial leverage (LEV) and the income variability
(SNI) variables are significant at the 5 percent level. The signs of
these two coefficients are as expected. The negative sign on the LEV
coefficient indicates that the higher is the equity to total asset
ratio (the less financial leverage is employed) the lower is a bank's
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total risk. The positive coefficient for SNI indicates that total
risk varies directly with net income variability.
2
The adjusted R of the estimated equation is 0.468. As additional
2
explanatory variables are added to the basic model the adjusted R
changes by small amounts, and the sizes, signs, and significance of
the coefficients from the basic model on line 1 change very little.
This suggests that the estimates in the basic model are robust.
Altering LEV by adding the selected off-balance sheet items to
total assets produces an adjusted leverage variable (ALEV). Estimated
coefficients using ALEV in place of LEV are shown on line 2 of Table 3,
This variable is not superior to the unadjusted leverage measure in
2
explaining total risk as is indicated by the decline in adjusted R
and the reduced significance of the coefficient of ALEV compared to
that of LEV. This result suggests that the market does not simply
make an adjustment in the financial leverage measure to incorporate
information about certain off-balance sheet activities of banks.
Lines 3 through 8 of Table 3 introduce to the basic model various
groups and individual off-balance sheet items, each as a percent of
total assets. Since the off-balance sheet items constitute a hetero-
geneous collection of participations, commitments, and other arrange-
ments, it is difficult to represent the influence of these items in
any simple way. The independent variables introduced on lines 3
through 8 attempt to group items with similar characteristics. The
specific items constituting each variable are listed at the bottom of
Table 3.
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At the outset it can be seen chat all of the off-balance sheet
variables have negative coefficients. Three of these estimated co-
efficients are significant at the 5 percent level (OB, PART, and SLC),
two are significant at the 10 percent level (SWAP and CLC), and the
coefficient on COMM is not significantly different from zero. These
results suggest that at least some of the off-balance sheet items do
have a significant impact on total risk., and that this impact is risk-
reducing. This result is consistent with the results of Brewer,
Koppenhaver, and Wilson [1986] for standby letters of credit but
extends these results to other categories of off-balance sheet items.
Table 4 presents estimates of model (2) using systematic risk,
B,
,
as the dependent variable. Again, the coefficients of the basic
model are on line 1. As was the case for model (1), LEV and SNI have
significant coefficients with the same signs as in Table 3. In addi-
tion the growth (GROW) and operating leverage (OPLEV) variables have
coefficients that are significant at the 5 percent level. These base
model coefficients are stable across alternative specifications of the
2
model. The adjusted R varies slightly across the various model spe-
cifications.
The coefficient of the adjusted financial leverage variable (ALEV)
2is significant and positive. Although its t-ratio and the adjusted R
on line 2 are higher than for the base model, the difference is slight,
None of the other off-balance sheet variable coefficients is signif-
icantly different from zero. This suggests that off-balance sheet
activity has no impact on a bank's measure of systematic risk.
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Finally, Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients
among all variables used in the regressions. This table indicates
that there is some multicollinearity among the independent variables
in both models (1) and (2).
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper two accounting-based models are estimated to test
the impact of off-balance sheet risk on total risk, and systematic risk
for large commercial banks and bank holding companies. Accounting
data for the five year period 1981-1985 is used along with a variety
of off-balance sheet items from bank call reports for a sample of 81
large banks.
The estimated coefficients of independent variables incorporating
various aspects of the off-balance sheet position are statistically
significant in a model explaining total risk, but not significant in
a model explaining systematic risk. The impact of the off-balance
sheet items on total risk is negative indicating that these items tend
to reduce the total risk of these banking firms. Since the results
indicate that off-balance sheet risk affects total risk and not sys-
tematic risk, off-balance sheet risk is not a concern of well-
diversified investors. While the FDIC is concerned with total risk
and the probability of failure, the risk-reducing tendencies of the
off-balance sheet items indicates that regulatory actions to penalize
the activities leading to these positions by requiring additional
capital may be inappropriate.
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TABLE 1
SCHEDULE RC-L OFF-BALANCE SHEET VARIABLES
Item
// Variable Title
1 Securities borrowed
2 Securities lent
3 Commitments to purchase when-issued securities
4 Commitments to sell when-issued securities
5 Notional value of interest rate swaps
6 Standby letters of credit to U.S. addresses
7 Standby letters of credit to non U.S. addresses
8 Standby letters of credit participated to others
9 Commercial letters of credit
10 Commitments to purchase foreign currencies
11 Unused loan commitments
12 Commitments to purchase futures & forward contr.
13 Commitments to sell futures & forward contracts
14 Obligations to purchase under option contracts
15 Obligations to sell under option contracts
16 Participations in acceptances conveyed to others
17 Participations in acceptances acquired from others
18 Other significant commitments or contingencies
19 Loans sold or participated to others
*Average values for 81 bank, samples as of year-end 1986.
As a % As a %
of Total of Total
As s e t s * Equity*
0.12% 2.14%
0.19% 3.40%
0.38% 7.05%
0.29% 5.20%
8.62% 171.70%
4.89% 93.44%
0.87% 17.02%
0.57% 11.27%
1.15% 21.51%
19.17% 385.27%
24.10% 454.60%
2.94% 58.21%
2.27% 44.08%
0.70% 13.62%
0.35% 6.64%
0.40% 7.28%
0.02% 0.29%
1.54% 29.90%
2.44% 46.44%
TABLE 2
VARIABLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Variable
Standard
Symbol Mean Deviation
V 0.922 0.3185
V 0.078 0.0169
LEV 0.055 0.0128
GROW 0.111 0.0799
CAPLAB 1.168 0.3762
OPLEV 0.720 2.7572
SNI 11.194 32.4532
ALEV 0.042 0.0146
OB 0.396 0.4040
COMM 0.039 0.0668
PART 0.023 0.0259
SWAP 0.041 0.0812
SLC 0.044 0.0384
CLC 0.010 0.0088
Systematic Risk.
Total Risk.
Financial Leverage
Growth Rate of Net Income
Capital Labor Ratio
Operating Leverage
Standard Deviation of Net Income
Adjusted Financial Leverage
Off-Balance Sheet Group
Commitments
Participations
Notional Value of Swaps
Standby Letter of Credit
Commercial Letter of Credit
For a sample of 81 commercial banks and bank holding companies
H Z
3* C
fO a
cr
'Si
-o n o fB
n WC > o i-n n
c o 70 2 o l-r> CO
r> rw H 2 03 1
h—
a ) 1 i 1 03
1—
•
3
sO ck/i 00 >—
rs>
u) 0>3 CO
+ +
+
+ O 1
~j >-* o* 3
OS >-• CO rr
i UJ + 3* 3*
+ n n
oo
1—
+
i—
i
-~4
1
a
<
CD
it
CD
+
+
00 0)
1
1— + H* A
sO H-
U* so
o-
+ + IB
CD
CD
O
>-• (-• r->
00 o
+
O
o
3
CD
H-
CD
rr
Om
rr
3*
IB
»-n
O
i—
o
<
3
OQ
H-
rr
IB
a
CD
r>»
1
o
a
5?
C
rr
<
CD
I-*
c
n
rr
1
i-l
CD
rr
H-
o
IS
•
o h-» IS) »—
i
*— H-
o • h- • O
sO
-O O *- iji £~
CO 0* Is) OS sO
/~
*
1O /-s 4 y^ 4
£~ • U» • *» •
• i-n • os • <J!
C- 00 o «• u> S/lM Is) u» *• sO oo
^ P— ^** oo ^—
'
~J
^s O ^"s O *—s O *"^ o ^^ o
— . — • M • H* • h-»•
h- i—
'
i—> i—
»
h-h- OO r- h-
• o • o • >—
•
»0D • o
U1 00 I—'ls> 00 N sO ^J N H
Ul O »-*^4 U) "si Is) s/l Ul *•
*^
1o •-S o y^ o
•e- • Ul • *• •
• Wl • \Jt • OS
C- C7> sO H- so U»
-~l o 00 OS w sO
^-^ *» s—
'
•-S
o
•
OS
0>
1
o
•
o
^-s
IS)
SO
so
1
o
o
Is)
1
/-s O
rsj •
• w
OS H-
Is) SO
-^^ OS
~o
U) •
• *-
sO sO
o
o
z
wH
>
PI
<
pi
<
Is) O
Is)O
HO
• •
00 o
Is) U)
u> o
• •
O M
OS U>
N_^ oo
M O
• •
00 u>O *•
^o
I—• •
• o
S/l u>
VJ1 I-1
• o
|sj O
r> O
• o
OS s«>
--s O
I— •
• o
N) OJ
•C- tsj
'-s O
o
IS)
I
/-N O
(-• •
• oO ISJ
sO I—
o
• o
OS Ui
sO ts>
• oO ro
Ul O
--s O
h- •
• o
s/i O
vO >Ji
s-^ 00
O ^sO
• o
LJ O
x> o
-"N O
*» •
• o
vfl O
Is) O
+~r IS)
• o
is) O
s/i O
>-• QS
<-N O
Ul •
• o
*• o
ro o
• o
U> O
00 Ol
• o
rs> o
U) O
s-y OS
*~s O
*• •
• o
-vi o
OS o
1 IS)
fs)
'-s O
»-• •
• oM O
U) £-
s^ Is)
• o
oj O
c- O
*- •
• o
s/i o
•c- o
s^ IS)
• o
h* O
o *
• o
*• o
H- O
'-s O
*» •
• o
*- o
^J o
s^ N)
• o
s/» O
SO s^
s/ \0
o o
00 o
• o
o o
so oV IS)
• o
o o
y-s O
o •
• o
vO o
OS U>
>-y Os
o ~o
*> s^ *- * *•
00 Is) 00 so OS
s-> — *• t-> *•
• o
*- o
o o
«—
• oo
*-N O
*- •
• o
v-J O
«- o
^^ rs)
is)
O
o
• o
uj o
00 o
'-s O
• o
U1 O
U) O
<
—
ts)
OS
00
o
-o
>
>
r
o
c-
n
o
n
>
r*
>
35
o
-a
<
H
l-H2
>H
8
m
r
[71
Crt
in
o
:»
o
>H
i-<O
z
HOH
>
r
c/>
>
0=
r
pi
?ol
H Z
3" C
It 8
M — n o
n »c > o Ml 1
r
h S5 5S
Ml
1
cr
GO
• 1 I 1 • i
i 3
c <7>v/i -M 3
-o
CD
* +
it
1
If
-*j — C7> 3
» *^ r»
1
W * y 3"
+ it <t
00
r—
-J <t
rt
CD
It
-- >— 1
<
CD
+ 00 i CD
+ n n
— + — A
fl *- 0)
v/> ~o o-
>—
»
CB
+ n
50
X
O
^- t>— e*
00 o nO
c
+ 3 It
>—
•
« <f CD
rt
O
r>
3"
It
CD
k^
C
ft
r»
1
1
CD
I
00
VO I—
\0 C*
vD O
00 ro ro W
00 ~-J
I I
^ 00 ^ 00
u> • v-J
•
• lv> • O
o O O 00O M 00 O
• 00 • vO
O wi o cr-
£* t«n ui CO
a*
a*
vO O^O U>
3
It
O
>—* »—
1
^~s h^ O
00 • -«4 • z
ro • 1-) c/>
«-
-J 0* 00 HO ~J — U) >
^^
1
^ 00
zH
U) • r
• *- enW cr> <
vO vO
N—
'
1
£
Cr- ui roO 00 <
o o
*- o
3
00.
o o
• •
cr- w
00 r-
O r-
vO O
N> -J
o o
ro O
ro ro
^ i /-s 1o ^*s 1o
r-o • to • ro •
• 00 • V0 • COH *o fO o ro ^o
r~j 00 U o cr- •*>
«-s o
• o
•— 00
O >-"
• o
I— 00
o s
• oO 00
r%> O
I
o
• o
H- CO
ro O
^J O
o •
• o
IO
• oO 00
<_n ho
• 00O M
v^
i ^>i 4 ~4
• o • o • O • o
*• NJ I> rsj w N> Ul hJ
« 1-0 vO u> r^j C* UJ o>
1—
'
O* ^^ ^j ^^ o ~—
*
a
~ o
• o
ho O
00 ro
• O
i- O
• O
ro O
• o
^, o
ro to
• O
uj o
t— K>
• o
• O
•— O
oo ro
ro •
• O
-j ro
\0 CO
^- O^
r+ o
ro •
• o
o o
^> o
• vO
• of vO
00 o
£- i»n
w O
• O
ro O
00 ro
m
to
H
rn
o
rn
"I
m
<
5
ro
o
mo
c:
>H
o
z
CO
H
rn
>
7^
>
PI
O
10
OS 00 00
o^
o
vO o
ro
O
SO
;cl
TABLE 5
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
n=8l
LEV GROW CAPLAB OPLEV SNI 3 S. ALEV OB COMI1 PART SWAP SLC CLC
.
_L_ _L_
1.00
1 0.40 1.00
AB -0.24 -0.15 1.00
IV -0.11 0.00 -0.02 1.00
-0.35 -0.35 0.07 0.14 1.00
. -0.51 -0.46 0.24 -0.16 0.40 1.00
_L -0.56 -0.40 0.22 -0.02 0.56 0.71 1.00
J 0.91 0.45 -0.28 -0.17 -0.41 -0.54 -0.51 1.00
-0.57 -0.43 0.31 0.15 0.35 0.40 0.24 -0.77 1.00
1 -0.37 -0.21 0.34 -0.02 0.09 0.29 0.13 -0.45 0.51 1.00
. -0.36 -0.28 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.29 0.07 -0.47 0.62 0.46 1.00
? -0.43 -0.28 0.31 0.12 0.26 0.31 0.18 -0.56 0.78 0.48 0.60 1.00
-0.56 -0.42 0.29 0.12 0.44 0.41 0.26 -0.71 0.86 0.43 0.60 0.80 1.00
-0.40 -0.44 0.27 0.06 0.21 0.36 0.22 -0.64 0.78 0.41 0.47 0.52 0.61 1.00
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